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BOOK REVIEWS
Money and Exchange Dealing in International Banking. By
Nigel R.L. Hudson. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979, Pp. xi, 135.
In an effort to dissipate the aura of mystique behind international
banking, Nigel Hudson has written a text-style economic book oriented
toward explaining "how the basic international banking functions are per-
formed, both in theory and in practice. It serve[s] as a useful reference
point for students of banking, individuals who are entering the field of
international banking, and outside observers such as customers and aca-
demics who would like to know more about how bankers run their inter-
national business." (p. vii.).
The author is quick to point out that in the process of explaining and
simplifying the theories involved in international banking "certain very
specialized practices have been excluded" (p.ix.). Rather than acting as a
limitation on the professional banking practices, this 'caveat' is an addi-
tional illustration of the practical application of these theories. Since the
book is directed toward those first year economists or financiers who have
yet to develop the specific skills required in international trading, Hudson
takes great care in defining the basic economic terms and concepts.' Only
after setting such a foundation does he relate these terms to theory and
then theory to practice. In explaining these basics to the amateur econo-
mist, it is necessary to detail "very specialized practices." Enough concen-
tration is expended grasping the complicated concepts involved in inter-
national banking, let alone trying to familiarize oneself with specific
practices. This is not to say that the theories are explained in a compli-
cated manner, only that the theories presented are complicated to
explain.
Many of the book's twelve chapers are broken down into a number of
subsections, each subsection detailing a specific subject. Definitions of rel-
evant terms precede any explanations of theory. Theory is then illus-
trated by current hypotheticals aimed toward the financier but hardly the
first-year economic student. Thus, "Because of the involvement with
figures, an aptitude for mathematics is looked for when hiring a dealer"
(p. 101.) and when reading this book.
The book as a whole sets the stage for the money dealer-to-be lead-
An extensive glossary of economic terms, concepts and professional jargon is found in
the back of the book.
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ing the reader through four stages of training; 1) theory, 2) organization
and operation of a dealing department, 3) risks and responsibilities of a
dealer, 4) peculiarities in the profession.
A brief history of international dealing develops the objectives laid
down at Bretton Woods for the newly established International Monetary
Fund. Because of the unexpected growth of U.S. dollar reserves between
19511971, to the point that they exceeded gold reserves, former Presi-
dent Nixon was forced to take the United States off'the gold standard.
With these drastic changes in the international exchange system and the
development of large Eurocurrency deposits, the importance of the inter-
national dealer became increasingly important as the theories and prac-
tices became more complicated. The next two chapters cover the basic
theories of exchange rates, interest rates, and types of deposits, all of
which are easily comprehendable by the student with little economic
knowledge.
The organization section of Hudson's book offers an insight into the
day-to-day operations of a dealing department. Objectives, customer ex-
pectations, and the making and recording of deals are explained by the
use of such aids as organizational flow charts, which are often highlighted
with an alphabetized checklist which the neophytic dealer may wish to
consult.
The concepts presented thus far require no real knowledge of inter-
national dealing. Mere exposure to a dealing office atmosphere would of-
fer the same background. Hudson takes a drastic step in the third section
by presenting and explaining sophisticated dealing theories, including
position-taking, spot and forward dealing, covering positions and inter-
national 'interest arbitrage. Though these theories are well explained us-
ing diagrams, written formulas, and mathematical equations, more expo-
sure to financial dealing is needed.
Having gained the requisite knowledge in theory, Hudson introduces
the particularities affiliated with the profession. Customs in dealing with
influential customers (e.g., central banks, multinational corporations) are
stressed because their trade and monetary policies play a strong role in
domestic and foreign money markets. Unfortunately, the explanation of
these markets is brief and should be used by the dealer with caution.
Kenneth S. Ginsberg*
* Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. candidate, (1983).
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Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea. R.
Michael M'Gonigle and Mark W. Zacher. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1979. Pp. xviii, 394. $15.95.
Focusing on the activities of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization (IMCO), and the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), this book traces international efforts to
control pollution from oil tankers. R. Michael M'Gonigle, a lawyer and
political scientist, is a specialist in international environmental affairs;
Mark W. Zacher is Director of the Institute of International Relations at
the University of British Columbia.
This study examines the intricate political processes involved in the
creation and application of international controls. It probes the powerful
economic forces and legal strategies which affect the making of marine
environmental policy. Rich in technical information, it is an important
contribution to the fields of international law and international
organization.
The great expansion in world oil consumption has led, of course, to a
tremendous increase in the transportation of oil by sea. This increase has
been marked by a sharp, global rise in maritime pollution. In 1973 alone,
over 6,700,000 metric tons of oil entered the world's oceans. Despite such
tragic and newsworthy tanker accidents as the Torrey Canyon, the Argo
Merchant, and the Amoco Cadiz, the authors note that 62 percent of all
ship-generated oil discharges are estimated to result from routine tanker
operations. After delivering their oil, tankers routinely take on seawater
ballast in order to maintain sufficient propeller immersion and stability.
Prior to loading a new cargo, this oily water must be flushed out. Tradi-
tionally and irresponsibly, the oily residues have simply been dumped
into the oceans.
A UN-sponsored conference meeting in Geneva in early 1948 pro-
duced the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization. There was strong industry opposition to this development,
but in 1958, after the required twenty-one states had ratified the conven-
tion, IMCO began operations. Functions conferred on the organization in-
clude those of passing recommendations, convening conferences, drawing
up conventions, and encouraging consultations among states.
Chapter 5, "Coastal State Rights: Intervention and Compensation,"
is one of the most significant parts of the work. Frequently, the victim of
oil pollution is an "innocent bystander"-the coastal state. Two areas
have been the focus of attention: the extent of a coastal state's power to
intervene in a maritime incident that threatens pollution, and the right of
the state to be compensated for resulting damages. It took the trauma of
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the Torrey Canyon disaster, however, to move interested parties to for-
mulate new rules.
When the Torrey Canyon ran aground in March 1967, 35 million gal-
lons of heavy oil polluted over a hundred miles of British and French
beaches. The possibility of such a major environmental disaster had ap-
parently not been sufficiently anticipated, as revealed by the inability of
the British government to cope with the accident.
... First, existing admiralty laws provided that there was to be a
waiting period before anyone other than the shipowner could intervene
in a high-seas shipping casualty. This was intended to give the shipowner
a chance to exercise his right of salvage and prevent further loss. Only
when he had failed to do so could another interest take over, it never
having been anticipated that this could seriously affect coastal interests.
In good maritime tradition, the British government did wait several days
before taking serious action against the Torrey Canyon. (p.145)
Second, there is in maritime law the principle of "limitation of liabil-
ity," which holds that a shipowner may limit his obligation to provide
compensation for damage. The 1957 Convention on the Limitation of Lia-
bility set the amount for property damage at about $67 per ton of the
ship's tonnage. This level of compensation was, of course, woefully inade-
quate for the pollution damage caused by the Torrey Canyon.
Shortly after the accident, the United Kingdom asked IMCO to call
an international meeting for the purpose of re-examining the scope of lia-
bility. It was not until 1971, however, that IMCO took action on this
issue.
Meanwhile, the seven major oil companies created the "Tanker Own-
er's Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution" (TOVALOP).
TOVALOP is a guarantee by participating tankerowners to reimburse na-
tional governments for cleanup expenses resulting from spillages of crude
oil from their tankers. "TOVALOP is, therefore, a voluntary agreement
among shipowning interests for the benefit of a third party, the govern-
ment of a polluted coastal state. It is not a contract with such a govern-
ment. No states are party to the agreement, and no questions of jurisdic-
tion arise." (p.157)
TOVALOP was the first in a series of compensation arrangements
that were to be created over the next several years. The main provisions
of each are summarized in Chart 12 (pp.194-195). Liability is imposed on
the tanker "owner," now defined to include the bareboat charterer. Re-
acting to one of the thorniest problems connected with the Torrey Can-
yon, steps were taken to remedy certain deceptive corporate practices,
such as those exemplified by the legal relationship between the Barracuda
Tanker Corporation and Union Oil.
The nature of liability, however, remains virtually unchanged. It coy-
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ers only governmental cleanup costs-not damage-and is incurred solely
on the basis of the "fault with a reversed burden of proof" test. The effect
of this is to create a presumption of negligence against the tankerowner
which he can rebut if he can prove that the discharge of oil from his...
tanker occurred without any fault on the part of the said tanker." (p.158)
TOVALOP has nevertheless proven to be a worth-while guarantee to
governments. Over 99 percent of all privately owned tanker tonnage is
now party to the arrangement, and hundreds of claims have been settled
under it. It is, however, a limited remedy in that it extends only to gov-
ernmental cleanup costs and excludes "all indirect or ecological damage
and all actual losses." (p.159)
In 1971, 38 oil companies drew up the Contract Regarding an Interim
Settlement of Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL). The maxi-
mum liability of the CRISTAL fund was set at $30 million per incident,
whereas TOVALOP had a limit of $10 million per incident.
The 1971 IMCO conference yielded mixed results. On the positive
side, the International Fund's total liability was set at $35 million per
incident, with the provision that it could be increased to $70 million in
case of unusually demanding incidents.
The most significant activity at the conference, however, was the de-
bate on liability for pollution from unidentified ships. The importance of
this issue is revealed by the fact that over two-thirds of all ship-source oil
pollution comes from intentional discharges whose sources can rarely be
identified. This problem is of particular concern to the coastal states of
Africa, whose shores are constantly polluted by passing traffic. Detecting
culprits is extremely difficult because oil slicks often come ashore months
after discharges have occurred.
It was, therefore, a defeat for many coastal states, as well as environ-
mentalists, when the conferees decided that any claimant against the
fund must show "that the damage resulted from an incident," a require-
ment that necessitates proving the identity of the polluting tanker. "Any
hope that the fund would introduce some broad industry accountability
for the condition of ... the oceans was dashed." (p187)
Chapter 6 presents a concise discussion of some of the results of the
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III), with
emphasis being placed on the "Informal Composite Negotiating Text"
(ICNT). For the first time in the history of international law, ICNT gives
coastal states a legal environmental interest in waters beyond territorial
seas-in the 200-mile economic zone. The authors view this as an im-
portant first step for coastal state environmental protection, but only in
the long run. "In the immediate future, the powers granted to the coastal
state in this zone are apparently important but in fact are quite insignifi-
cant." (p.248)
Chapter 7, "The Environmental Law of the Oceans: Determinants of
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Change," includes an excellent analysis of the roles of particular states
and blocs of states in the law-making process. Readers should find the
discussion of the role of the United States especially interesting. The au-
thors note that since the late 1960s, America has paradoxically been both
the most radical and also among the most conservative of states with re-
spect to maritime environmental questions. Because of the strength of the
environmental movement in the United States, support for many general
environmental improvements has been demonstrated by American negoti-
ators. On the other hand, the United States has created and maintained a
very extensive system of "flags-of-convenience." This system, which came
about after the Second World War, allows American shipowners to regis-
ter their vessels in foreign countries in order to avoid such economic bur-
dens as American taxes, construction standards, and crew regulations.
Today, for example, almost half of the Liberian and Panamanian fleets
are actually owned by American interests. As a consequence, the United
States must bear a great measure of responsibility for the dismal environ-
mental policies of these flag-of-convenience states.
The concluding chapter, "The Political Process and the Future of
Environmental Protection," presents the case for accelerating efforts to
improve the marine environment.
The long-term resolution of ocean oil pollution and other interna-
tional environmental problems awaits the creation of a truly effective
structure of international regulation. This will happen only if states, pri-
vate interests, and international secretariats can coalesce in the interna-
tional political arena to produce workable and acceptable solutions ....
To ensure that the conditions for success prevail at all levels is the great
challenge of the global environmental crisis. (p.365)
Roy E. Thoman*
* Professor of Political Science, West Texas State University.
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